News Oct 27, 2026

Who Governs—and Who Must Flee? Nidaa Hilal Addresses State Authority as Conflict Drives Displacement in Yemen and Lebanon

An American University discussion examines armed movements, accountable governance, and the conditions shaping civilian protection in two countries experiencing overlapping displacement crises.

By Anise Welty

WASHINGTON, D.C., October 22, 2026 — Why do the Houthis and Hezbollah wield influence in Yemen and Lebanon? How do religious identities, political institutions, and external actors shape their relationships with the state? What distinguishes public support from compliance under pressure? Nidaa Hilal explored these questions with Ambassador Ashraf Haidari’s Comparative Politics class at American University, examining a central challenge: Who governs when state authority is weak?

Hilal joined the class in person, drawing on more than 25 years of international experience as a Senior Strategic Communications and Policy Adviser, Founder and Chief Executive Officer of StandOut Communications, and Founder of the JANI Foundation. Preparatory readings introduced students to the conflicts, while her presentation deepened their understanding of state capacity, sovereignty, legitimacy, political violence, and accountability.

“Armed movements shape public authority in distinct ways across Yemen and Lebanon. Understanding these dynamics requires examining how authority is established, exercised, and held accountable; how external actors influence these processes; and how each country’s political history, institutional landscape, power structures, and lived experiences shape the relationship between state institutions and armed actors,” Hilal said.

The Houthis and Hezbollah: Different Relationships with the State

Hilal began with the Houthis, whose movement developed in northern Yemen before expanding militarily and seizing Sanaa in 2014. They now exercise de facto authority over territory and institutions in areas they control. Their influence combines security enforcement, administration, revenue collection, and political narratives within Yemen’s fragmented governance landscape.

Hezbollah, established during Lebanon’s civil war in the 1980s, has followed a different institutional path. It participates in elections and government while maintaining independent armed capabilities and political and social-service networks. Its influence extends beyond southern Lebanon into other communities and institutions, complicating the relationship between formal state authority and power exercised outside state control.

The comparison revealed different governance challenges. In Yemen, rival authorities and divided institutions constrain the internationally recognized government’s reach. In Lebanon, national institutions persist, but Hezbollah’s independent military power limits the state’s control over force. Recent government efforts to seize Hezbollah weapons and explosives illustrate the difficulty of translating legal authority into effective enforcement.

Religious identity featured in the discussion, but the two movements should not be treated as interchangeable or assumed to represent entire communities. The Houthis have roots in Zaydi Shia Islam, while Hezbollah draws primarily on Lebanon’s Shia community. Hilal examined how services, enforcement, shared identity, and limited alternatives can shape compliance, emphasizing that compliance alone does not establish consent.

Her presentation distinguished four questions: Who can enforce decisions? Can institutions raise revenue and provide services? Do people regard authority as justified and responsive? Who can scrutinize decisions or seek redress? These distinctions between control, capacity, legitimacy, and accountability helped students move beyond a purely military understanding of armed movements and their influence.

International Influence and Civilian Consequences

Hilal also examined external involvement. Iran supports both movements, while Saudi Arabia has backed Yemen’s internationally recognized government. Israel’s confrontation with Hezbollah has further shaped Lebanon’s security environment. These relationships involve strategic interests as well as religious connections and influence the prospects for political settlements in Yemen and Lebanon.

Houthi attacks on Saudi airports and shipping have extended Yemen’s conflict beyond its borders. In Lebanon, Israeli strikes that killed senior Hezbollah commanders in September 2024 disrupted the movement’s leadership and weakened it militarily. Such confrontations also expose civilians to escalating insecurity, infrastructure damage, and interrupted livelihoods, linking regional conflict to domestic humanitarian emergencies.

Current humanitarian reporting demonstrates the consequences of these overlapping pressures. Conflict can force immediate flight, while damaged services, lost income, food insecurity, and poverty can prolong displacement and obstruct return. The UN’s response plans for Yemen and Lebanon describe crises in which insecurity and economic deterioration reinforce existing vulnerabilities.

Yemen: Internal Displacement, Cross-Border Flight, and Continued Arrivals

In Yemen, renewed fighting has uprooted families already living through a prolonged emergency. IOM reported on October 5 that more than 184,000 people had been displaced between August 1 and October 4. This figure measures displacement during that escalation, rather than the country’s total displaced population.

For displaced households, reaching another location does not necessarily restore safety or self-reliance. Conflict-induced economic deterioration and climate-related shocks compound shortages of essential services and assistance. The 2026 Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan describes these interacting pressures, showing why displacement can become prolonged even when families move away from active fighting.

Others have sought protection abroad. In September, UNHCR reported that more than 3,000 people had fled Yemen by boat to African destinations, including Djibouti and Somalia. Cross-border flight extends humanitarian responsibilities to receiving communities, whose shelter, water, healthcare, and education systems also require support.

At the same time, Yemen remains a country of refuge and transit. UNHCR reports that it hosts more than 64,000 refugees and asylum-seekers, mainly from Somalia and Ethiopia. Separately, IOM recorded 134,100 migrant arrivals by the end of September 2026. These are different populations and measures: neither all migrants nor all people crossing a border have the same legal status or reasons for moving.

These simultaneous movements reveal how constrained people’s options can become across a conflict-affected region. Those entering Yemen may encounter new dangers, while those leaving face hazardous crossings and exploitation. IOM’s October reporting calls for action against smugglers alongside safe, regular pathways, underscoring the need to address protection risks along the entire journey.

Lebanon: Refugees and Host Communities Face Overlapping Crises

In Lebanon, renewed hostilities have displaced Lebanese residents while also affecting Syrian and Palestinian refugees and migrant communities. The September 2026 response-plan addendum describes damaged homes, disrupted services, livelihood losses, and mounting pressure on local authorities. People who previously escaped another conflict can consequently be uprooted again within their country of refuge.

Poverty compounds these risks by reducing families’ ability to secure accommodation, replace lost income, or absorb another emergency. UNHCR’s Lebanon reporting documents severe deprivation among refugee households, while its protection overview identifies needs involving legal assistance and civil documentation. Such obstacles can complicate access to protection and recovery without being the original cause of flight.

Some people have crossed from Lebanon into Syria, including both Syrian and Lebanese nationals, as documented in UNDP’s March 2026 regional assessment. These movements require careful interpretation: returning to a country of origin under pressure from renewed violence elsewhere does not automatically constitute a safe or sustainable solution.

Likewise, returning to a home area within Lebanon does not necessarily end displacement-related hardship. UNHCR has warned that returnees face damaged housing, insecurity, and inadequate essential services. Durable recovery depends on whether people can remain safely and rebuild their lives, rather than on return figures alone.

Rebuilding Trust, Protection, and Accountable Authority

Hilal emphasized humanitarian assistance, education, development, and good-faith negotiations. Her presentation also acknowledged policy tradeoffs: security assistance can strengthen institutions while shifting internal power balances; negotiations can reduce violence while risking the legitimization of coercion; and abrupt aid reductions can undermine essential services. Her focus on accountable authority and visible public services intersects with the recovery priorities of the Lebanon Response Plan.

The comparison brought the class back to the relationship between authority and people’s lived experiences. Viewed alongside humanitarian reporting, it also raises a practical measure of governance: whether people can obtain protection, access essential services, and maintain livelihoods without repeated flight. Addressing those needs requires sustained attention to both displaced populations and host communities, as reflected in the UN response frameworks for Yemen and Lebanon.

#climate change#democracy#displaced women#displaced youth#emergency response#forced displacement#forced migration#freedom#human rights#humanitarian crisis#Lebanese refugees#Lebanon crisis#Middle East#state fragility#Yemen#Yemeni refugees

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